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Abstract 
This paper characterizes José Celestino Mutis’ (1732-1808) appropriation of Newton in the 
Viceroyalty of New Granada. First, we examine critically traditional accounts of Mutis’ works 
highlighting, on the one hand, their inadequacy for directing their claims towards the nineteenth-
century independence from Spain and, on the other, for not differentiating between Newtonianism 
and Enlightenment. Next, we portray Mutis’ complex Newtonianism from his own statements and 
from printed sources, including a variety of works and translations from British, Dutch and French 
authors, in addition to a wide range of Newton’s writings, unusual for an eighteenth-century reader 
in America. Finally, we analyze a salient claim of Mutis’ Newtonianism in order to depict his 
appropriation and transformation of Newton’s ideas: the characterization of Newtonian experimental 
physics as a useful science. In so doing, Mutis further developed metaphysical and methodological 
positions not present in Newton’s works. 
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Enlightenment, Newtonianism and independence in the historiography of Mutis 
As early as 1923, the historian of mathematics Florian Cajori complained: “the early history of the 
mathematical sciences in America, especially in the Latin American colonies, has received little 
attention at the hands of scientific men.”1 Cajori’s complaint still stands for important areas of 
scientific activities during colonial and subsequent times. Indeed, we are still far from having a 
somewhat complete panorama of the reception and integration of scientific activities into the colonial 
life in America, from the conquest to the emergence of the republics in the early and mid-nineteenth 
century. In fact, the common assertion that the introduction and reception of modern science played 
a role in the independence of these territories is another story to be told. However, it seems fair to say 
that historians have been too hasty in depicting scientific activities as an obvious and self-evident 
aspect of the colonial life, and therefore one to be included among the causes of the separatist 
sentiment leading to the colonial emancipation. This classical view has its roots in the apocryphal 
versions of the history of science emerging in the dawn of the independence, put forward by the pupils 
and acquaintances of the main intellectual figures of the revolutionary processes. During the 
nineteenth century, this view was incorporated into hagiographic stories of the national heroes, as 
part of the construction of national identity. In the 1980s and 1990s, Thomas Glick, John Lynch, 
Anthony McFarlane, and others moderated this view suggesting that modern science had a mere 
instrumental role for creole scientists that is, science provided the foundation for the development of 
a creole identity that assimilated the sovereignty over a territory with the first-hand knowledge of it. 
This revisionist version relies on the claim that the Bourbon reformism had several unexpected and 
counterproductive effects over the royal aspirations of deploying its enlightened despotism over the 
Atlantic World. In fact, this reformism supported the intellectualization and technical training of local 
creole elites that saw in the Spanish monarchy the cause of the retrograde state of the New World. 
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In the particular case of the northern territories of South America –the Viceroyalty of New 
Granada– the studies on the introduction of early modern science bear two salient characteristics. 
First, the scientific development in New Granada was noteworthy in the context of America because 
of the emergence of a recognizable enlightened movement at the end of the eighteenth century, despite 
the very late and slow social, commercial, and political development of New Granada when compared 
with the Viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru.2 This development can be appreciated, for instance, 
in the growing scientific activities related to the Jesuits’ establishment of the Xaverian University and 
in Mutis’ pedagogical activities, such as the Botanical Expedition or the establishment in 1762 of the 
first chair of mathematics in New Granada that materialized institutions disseminating “new 
sciences.”3 Secondly, the classical view commonly portrays Mutis’ scientific and pedagogical 
activities as a cause for the emergence of the separatist sentiment leading to the revolution of 
independence. By introducing enlightened ideas into the Viceroyalty of New Granada, it is said, Mutis 
would have planted the seeds of moral autonomy as an inseparable component of his teaching and 
scientific activities. Classical studies on Mutis heavily rely on this teleological view. It can be sharply 
illustrated, for example, by Diego Mendoza’s foundational study of Mutis’ Botanical Expedition: “it 
is clear that José Celestino Mutis is the true forerunner of Independence (…) The science Mutis 
disseminated in the Colony prepared it spiritually for its independence.”4 
Despite its efforts to nuance this apologetic presentation of Mutis’ scientific activities and their 
impact on the intellectual figures conducting the revolution of independence, the revisionist version 
of this view presents similar and even more radical images of Mutis as a protagonist of New 
Granada’s independence process.5 Put briefly, this revised view claims that scientific endeavors led 
to a better understanding of natural resources and, in consequence, Spanish Americans realized, by 
accident, the potential of their territories as independent nations only in a medium-term process. For 
instance, Peset depicts Mutis as permanently playing a political role when performing his scientific 
activities. In his opinion, when Mutis arrived from Spain and during the time he planned to go back 
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to Europe, his activities were oriented towards the dominion of locals; conversely, when he decided 
to settle in America, Peset describes Mutis on the edge of being a promoter of the independence in 
the minds of his pupils. In consequence, Peset concludes: “He [Mutis] will henceforth be considered 
the father of Colombian science and independence.”6 Likewise, Frías-Nuñez sets out the problem of 
understanding the figure of Mutis by considering the features a portrait of Mutis should include and, 
after mentioning his most celebrated scientific achievements, he adds: “we cannot forget his activities 
and contributions – and the influence through his contributors –in creating the platform of what shall 
be the independents’ movement in Colombia.”7  
 Nevertheless, the connections between Mutis’ scientific activities –especially the Royal 
Botanical Expedition– and the political, economic, and historical events leading to the independence 
from Spain are far from being obvious. Silva has recently remarked the problems of this misleading 
view that holds that Mutis’ natural researches are but patriotic actions leading to a growing 
consciousness of national identity among the creoles; this “has favored the convergence between the 
scientific pantheon and the republican one.”8 This approach has made of Mutis a Colombian national 
hero. Beyond the well-known problems of doing history of a national hero, these anachronistic and 
goal-oriented readings of Mutis’ activities are deeply rooted in two basics misleading tenets. 
 Firstly, these readings depend on a now re-evaluated assessment of the role that education and 
science played in New Granada during the Bourbon Reforms, especially under the reign of Carlos III 
(1759-1788). It is commonly assumed that Bourbon Reforms led to the Enlightenment –or brought it 
from France– not only in metropolitan Spain but in the colonial territories as well. Bourbon rulers, in 
contrast with the Habsburgs, would have tried to modernize the administration of the colonies by 
promoting science and technical developments in order to improve the exploitation of natural 
resources and the production of goods for the commerce; thus changing the mining-based economy 
of the New World. Even those historians of science or ideas who are not centrally concerned with the 
political situation of the Spanish Empire causally connect the Bourbon’s rule with the Spanish 
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Enlightenment.9 However, historians such as Lynch, Mestre-Sanchis, and Pérez-García have shown 
how this rhetoric of modernization and enlightenment in Bourbon Spain is part of the propaganda 
that the new monarchy circulated when they ascended to the throne. For these historians, the 
introduction of early modern science in Spain came through the works of the so-called novatores, 
running back before the Bourbon House was enthroned in 1700. Mostly dedicated to chemical and 
medical problems, novatores such as Juan de Cabriada (1665-1714) or Diego Mateo Zapata (1664-
1745) were committed to various forms of experimentalism and rationalization of nature 
encompassing different traditions; Baconian experimentalism, Gassendian atomism, and Cartesian 
mechanical philosophy were articulated in the aim of criticizing the scholastic character of the 
Spanish university.10 
 Secondly, studies on Mutis’ conception of science has traditionally focused on the Botanical 
Expedition, reducing Mutis’ activities and goals to the subsequent impact of his botany on the so-
called enlightenment of New Granada. On this issue, Silva has indicated how Mutis’ works are 
reduced to one of his achievements and his texts are read out of context, leaving aside the intentions, 
directions, and expectations of his author and audiences.11 Indeed, the evident but complex links 
between the social institutions related to the Botanical Expedition and the process of independence 
have cast a shadow on Mutis’ own views on the importance of Newtonian philosophy for the New 
Granada. Mutis’ arguments do not have to coincide with those promoted by the Bourbon Reforms; 
but this does not mean that they have to conform to, or imply a creole identity around the ideals of 
freedom that became dominant among his students after 1808. In other words, we consider that it is 
problematic to read Mutis’ conception of science either as part of a plot of the Spanish Empire to 
subdue Americans through knowledge, or as a pro-independent project consisting in a renewed moral 
attitude leading to nationalism wrapped up in the Newtonian experimental physics, misleadingly 
equated with the Enlightenment. 
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 Central to these approaches is the problematic assumption that the Enlightenment is equivalent 
or necessarily connected with other historical categories such as Newtonianism. In the case of Mutis, 
his enthronement in the pantheon of national heroes, his pretended nationalist feelings, his alleged 
primacy in teaching the “New science” in America, the vindication of his scientific works by the 
nineteenth-century Colombian scholars as a source of moral autonomy and the emancipation of New 
Granada by his defense of the “New science,” and the causal connection between the Bourbons’ rule 
and the local enlightenment; all of these imprecise and teleological assumptions have in common a 
conception of enlightenment now deeply revaluated.12 In most cases, categories used by the historical 
actors to represent their activities and works such as “Newtonian philosophy,” “New science,” and 
“Modern philosophy” are uncritically borrowed from them; more often than not these adjectives are 
simply equated with enlightenment, hiding the valuable clues to uncover the specific features of the 
intellectual atmospheres of the late eighteenth-century New Granada. 
 Our aim is to set out a characterization of Mutis’ appropriation and defense of Newton’s 
experimental physics in New Granada. This –not the “Enlightenment”– is arguably the most enduring 
Mutisian contribution to the establishment of a view of knowledge shared by the communities that 
emerged during the second half of the eighteenth century. From a different angle, this paper is a 
contribution to the recent and growing scholarship on Newtonianism, by considering its reception in 
the peripheral context of New Granada; this is an effort to document Mutis’ most salient ideas about 
knowledge and natural research as an appropriation of Newton.13 The introduction of Newton’s 
Principia and Opticks through the visions that figures such as ’sGravesande and Musschenbroek 
made of these works seems not to have precedents in the young Viceroyalty. Therefore, our intention 
is to portray Mutis’ rich appropriation of Newton as an illustrative case of the reception and 
development of scientific ideas in the colonial America. This is a first step into a larger project to 
pinpoint this local setting into a wider and revisionist reading now in course of “The Enlightenment” 
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and its bonds with eighteenth-century Newtonianisms; or, to borrow Shank’s wording, with 
delineating a new provincialized Newton in New Granada.14 
This paper contains three sections. In the first, we analyze Mutis’ interpretation of Newton’s 
methodological pronouncements as presented in the lectures of mathematics at the Colegio del 
Rosario. In addition to Mutis’ interpretation of Newton’s analysis and synthesis methods, we present 
our discovery of his translation of ’sGravesande’s Physices elementa mathematica, an unpublished 
translation that had not been correctly identified. In the second section, we track the consequences of 
Mutis’ commitment to Newton for his project of the Botanical Expedition, including its theological 
foundations that includes a conception of the role of the king in administering God’s creations in the 
New World. Lastly, we consider in detail Mutis’ comments on the role of mathematics in the study 
of nature and how they reflect his commitment with Newton’s natural philosophy. This includes some 
features of Mutis’ translation of Wolff’s Elementa matheseos, which we also discovered in the 
archives of the Real Jardín Botánico of Madrid. 
 
Mutis as an eighteenth-century Newtonian 
Before looking in detail at Mutis commitments to Newton’s experimental physics, it is necessary to 
specify the elements implied in portraying Mutis’ variety of Newtonianism. For this, we take up some 
elements from the recent scholarship on Newtonianism. These are (a) the adequacy of the label 
Newtonian as a historiographical category; (b) Mutis’ own sense of the term Newtonian to represent 
himself and his own activities; and (c) the materialization of Mutis’ Newtonianism, that is the specific 
means by which it was developed, characterized, and presented to specific audiences. 
 (a) The label Newtonianism is one of the most revised categories of the “Newton industry.” 
Widely spread during the first half of the last century for describing, in a general way, the acceptance 
and diffusion of Newton’s methodological and theoretical tenets and concepts throughout the 
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it helped to construct the image of these centuries as a period in 
which Newton’s approach to natural-philosophical problems constituted the rationality of science par 
excellence. In the light of these considerations, several eighteenth-century authors from different 
fields –especially mathematics, natural philosophy, physics, medicine, and theology– from the 
Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Germany, and Italy were characterized as Newtonians, with little 
regard of the particular conditions under which they knew and used Newton’s methodological and 
theoretical principles. 
 Nevertheless, since the 1970s, the classical image of Newtonianism as a single, uniform set 
of principles changed as the outcome of more detailed and specific researches about Newtonian 
authors. As historians like Schaffer, Ducheyne, and van Besouw argue, the general understanding of 
Newtonianism is problematic, because it does not account for the particularities of the appropriation 
of Newton’s methodological and theoretical aspects in the different places where they were 
disseminated during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.15 Thus, by using Newton’s tenets and 
concepts, as well as his methodology for natural philosophy in diverse fields such as physics, 
medicine, chemistry, theology, geology, or zoology, these areas changed so much that it became 
impossible to distinguish the Newtonian features without considering them combined with the other 
traditions belonging to each discipline. Furthermore, Newton’s theoretical and methodological 
principles were blended with local traditions, resulting in the emergence of different Newtonianisms 
in which authors and conceptions of nature apparently not compatible with Newton’s own worldview 
were synthesized as the effect of the appropriation of Newton’s methodology and theories in those 
different geographical and disciplinary contexts. 
 In this sense, we studied the specific ways in which Mutis appropriated Newton by analyzing 
his own definition of what it is to be a Newtonian, rather than assessing Mutis’ ideas and including 
them in a general concept of Newtonianism. We will explore in some detail the ways in which Mutis’ 
developed particular views on knowledge from his own reading of Newton. In this way, we will show 
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that Mutis can be labeled as a Newtonian, not only because he presented an interpretation of Newton’s 
experimental physics, but also because he self-defined as such. As we shall argue, by Newtonianism 
Mutis did not mean an inflexible commitment to Newton’s claims nor a restriction to study the same 
topics that Newton did. Indeed, Mutis’ conception of the Newtonian philosophy was framed within 
the idea that God had commanded the King of Spain to exploit the natural resources of America in 
order to fulfil a divine plane. This being so, Newtonian philosophy is reshaped as a “useful science” 
(ciencia útil), pre-eminently including natural history and mineralogy –areas not explored by Newton 
but widely valued in the New World, in addition to the teaching of Newton’s physics and his 
mathematical approach to nature. The conception of the Newtonian philosophy emerging from this 
frame of divine commandment constitutes Mutis’ expanded views on knowledge, mathematics and 
observation in Newtonian-inspired ways, but distancing from Newton himself. 
It is important to specify that Mutis was not the only one concerned with the usefulness of 
science and the King’s responsibility to promote natural research. Indeed, the utility of science, as 
part of the relationship between Spain and its colonies was a problem widely recognized in the 
eighteenth century, as scholars have documented it.16 However, Mutis’ formulation of the usefulness 
of science and its subsequent identification with Newton’s philosophy is unique in his articulation of 
theological commitments, experimental approach, mathematical exigencies, and the moral duties of 
the philosopher responsible for the exploration of the “divine treasures.” In other words, Mutis’ 
solution to the then pressing problem of the utility of knowledge in the colony and in the Metropolitan 
Spain came from his appropriation of Newton, in which he saw a natural connection between utility, 
material progress, truth and religious concerns. 
(b) In his lectures, textbooks and in all documents intended to present and defend his views to 
broad audiences –students, colleagues, local and imperial authorities, the Catholic Inquisition–, Mutis 
exposed the advantages of the “Newtonian experimental physics” and portrayed himself as a 
Newtonian. He differentiated “Newtonian philosophy” from others trends in natural research –mainly 
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Peripatetic and the “hypothetical philosophy” of Descartes– because of its anti-systemic spirit and its 
emphasis upon experiments and mathematics. In Mutis’ opinion: 
Who would doubt that all progress in experimental physics is but a consequence of 
observations, experiments and the exact application of mathematics? The most 
illustrious mathematicians of the past, as well as those of the present century, have 
illuminated Physics with demonstrations and varied analytical calculations required to 
discover many truths that afterwards were found in line with experience. I should offer 
further proofs, more specific and determinate, if the entire corpus of Newtonian Physics 
were not but a continuous proof of what I have said.17 
Following this path, the natural philosopher shall not build up an explanation of all phenomena –a 
system– but just of some of them. This would be, however, a long-lasting contribution to the true 
understanding of nature, because it was achieved with the greatest certainty and not by “framing 
hypotheses”– a typical Newtonian wording that Mutis constantly paraphrased. For him, this anti-
systemic virtue of the Newtonian philosophy is present in two different contributions of Newton to 
the posterity: his method and his doctrine. Actually, Mutis sharply professed different degrees of 
commitment to each of them. On one hand, he embraced the “Newtonian method” without restriction, 
by considering both Newton’s pronouncements on the method of analysis and synthesis and the rules 
for natural philosophy as they were interpreted by ’sGravesande in his Physices Elementa 
Mathematica. Mutis presented the former in his inaugural lecture of 1764, Elements of natural 
philosophy, containing the principles of physics mathematically demonstrated and confirmed by 
observations and experiments: disposed for instructing the youth in the doctrine of the Newtonian 
philosophy in the Royal College of the Rosary of Santa Fe de Bogotá in the New Kingdom of Granada 
[Elementos de la filosofía natural, que contienen los principios de la física demostrados por las 
matemáticas y confirmados con observaciones y experiencias: dispuestos para instruir a la juventud 
en la doctrina de la filosofía newtoniana en el Real Colegio del Rosario de Santa fe de Bogotá en el 
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Nuevo Reino de Granada]. Contrary to what the title suggests, Mutis did not deal with any of the 
physical principles of Newton’s natural philosophy, but presented a historical panorama of its 
emergence and his interpretation of the method of analysis and synthesis as described by Newton in 
the “Query” 31 of the Opticks.18 Mutis begins his Elements by explaining the importance of natural 
philosophy by its utility. According to him, the usefulness of natural philosophy consists in providing 
the conditions to know God through his providence. Thus, the main merit of natural philosophy 
“consists in that it is a solid foundation for natural religion and for moral philosophy, leading man in 
agreeable way to the high knowledge of the author of nature, creator of the universe.”19 This passage 
reveals that Mutis’ conception of the utility of natural philosophy was not consistent with the 
enlightened ideal developed in Spain during mid-eighteenth century –especially during the reign of 
Carlos III. For Mutis the utility of natural philosophy was concerned with religious matters, as he 
argues that by knowing God’s actions on the creation it is possible to find the principles of natural 
religion and moral philosophy, which arguably recalls the final paragraph of Newton’s Query 31 of 
the Opticks. This theological emphasis is at odds with the common justification of science concerned 
with economic development and the improvement of the material conditions of Spanish territories.20 
Afterwards, Mutis explains that the certainty of this theologically founded study of nature 
depends on the application of the geometrical method of analysis and synthesis to the study of natural 
phenomena, just as Newton had described it in the Opticks. In Mutis’ words: 
In order to proceed with all certainty, and to get over disputes forever, [Newton] always 
relied on analytical and synthetic methods for the study of nature; so that, after 
beginning with phenomena or the effects, he moved to the discovery of powers or 
causes operating in nature. Similarly, he established that from particular causes it was 
necessary to move up to the more general ones and, from these latter to the most general 
cause. This is the analytical method. After discovering these causes, it should move 
down in an opposite order, considering [these causes] as principles already established 
12 
 
to explain by mean of them the less general causes and next all phenomena, 
consequence of [the less general causes]; in this way, the soundness and firmness of 
explanations are clearly noticed. This is the synthetic method. It can be appreciated that 
in Physics, as in Mathematics, the investigation of difficult things should proceed with 
the analytical method, in order to apply the synthetic method afterwards.21 
There are several elements in this passage concerning Mutis’ presentation of Newton’s methodology. 
We begin by the final statement. Mutis’ presentation of the order in which the methods should be 
applied is remarkably similar to that of Newton in the “Query” 31 of the Opticks: “As in 
Mathematicks, so in Natural philosophy, the investigation of difficult things by the method of 
analysis, ought ever to precede the method of composition.”22 The difficult things that Newton –and 
by extension Mutis– was talking about were the causes producing natural phenomena which are their 
visible effects. The difficulty of the investigation relies on the fact that the discovery of causes cannot 
be achieved by the mere observation of natural phenomena. Conversely, Newton argues that in order 
to determine the causal connection between a particular phenomenon and its possible cause it is 
necessary to apply different mathematical procedures. Therefore, he concludes: “By this way of 
analysis we may proceed from Motions to the Forces producing them; and in general, from effects to 
their causes, and from particular causes to more general ones, till the argument end in the most 
general.”23 In this sense, following Newton, Mutis argues that it is necessary to proceed from 
particular causes to the most general ones, in order to determine the first principles of nature; such an 
investigation can be only conducted by articulating an experimental approach to nature with a 
mathematical analysis of the observed phenomena.  
Another revealing aspect of the previous quotation is the particular concepts that Mutis used 
to characterize the results of the method of analysis and synthesis: powers (potencias) and phenomena 
(fenómenos). Both of them were representative of the main subject of physics as Mutis conceived it 
under the influence of ’sGravesande and of Mutis concerns regarding the very possibility of being 
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understood by his students. In the manuscript containing Mutis’ translation of ’sGravesande’s 
Physices elementa mathematica –which we shall describe in the next section–, we can see that Mutis 
conceived natural phenomena in mechanical terms as he defined them as “all movements and all 
situations of natural bodies not depending immediately from an intelligent being and that are 
perceptible by our senses.”24 Based on this definition, we can assume that, in Mutis’ opinion, the 
method of analysis allows to discover the causes of the motion of the bodies in nature: their powers, 
which he called potencias. For Mutis, physics is the study of powers causing the motion of bodies in 
nature. Thus, he proposed a reformed-mechanical physics, opposed to the Aristotelian physics taught 
in New Granada during the first half of the eighteenth century.25 
For Mutis, the mathematical explanation of the principles discovered by analysis is one of the 
most important features of Newton’s method for three reasons: (1) it illustrates the importance of 
mathematics for physics; (2) it allows to propose the particular causes discovered by observation and 
experiments as general causes and consequently to formulate them as universal laws. This is a central 
point for Mutis, because (3) it leads to know how God acts on his creation. According to Mutis, God 
interacts with his creation through a set of universal laws, established in order to rule and govern the 
motion of bodies. Hence, by adopting Newton’s redefinition of the disciplinary boundaries between 
natural philosophy and theology, Mutis presented in his Elements one of the most intricate features 
of Newton’s thought. We shall explain this particular point later when we consider the theological 
foundations of Mutis’ formulation of the Botanical Expedition. 
 On the other hand, Mutis’ interpretation of Newton’s rules for philosophy is another revealing 
instance of his appropriation of Newtonianism as he used a translated version of ’sGravesande 
Physices Elementa Mathematica that he himself prepared for his students and that we discovered in 
the archives of the Real Jardín Botánico of Madrid. The translation, probably made in the 1760s, 
presents a conceptual description of the subject of physics as it is discussed in the first books of 
’sGravesande work, emphasizing on the definition of concepts and the problems emerging from those 
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definitions.  It is consists of the first five chapters of Book I of the Physices elementa mathematica, 
where ’sGravesande discusses the basic constitution of bodies, the theological foundations of the laws 
of nature, and the role of Newton’s rules for studying nature; partial as it is, this is still the only  
existing translation into Spanish of the Physices elementa mathematica.   
’sGravesande introduced his reference to Newton’s rules for philosophy with the intention of 
explaining how to proceed in order to find the regularities of the motions of the bodies and to 
generalize them as laws of motion: “It should be noted as well that in the enquiry of these laws the 
rules of Newtonian method shall be followed accurately; these rules are founded on the axiom we 
have already established.”26 It is worth noting that, in his translation, Mutis emphasized the need of 
applying Newton’s rules accurately (con toda exactitud), because such an emphasis is not present in 
’sGravesande’s version. This shows that Mutis was convinced of the utility of Newton’s rules in the 
study of nature and, in consequence, he promoted them as the only legitimate method to achieve a 
diligent study of any natural phenomena. 
Mutis’ use of ’sGravesande’s theological foundation of Newton’s rules for philosophy in his 
lectures on physics reveals that Mutis was interested in supporting his presentation of Newton’s 
methodology on theological principles, more precisely, on the idea that, by discovering the laws of 
motion that God created, it is possible to discern his providence. After explaining the theological 
foundation of Newton’s rules for philosophy, ’sGravesande presents the rules as Newton proposed 
them at the beginning of Book III of the Principia.27 In the original version of the Physices elementa 
mathematica, ’sGravesande used the rules as a conclusion of Chapter I where he determines the 
subject and scope of physics. Then, he proceeded to explain the general properties of bodies and how 
they determine the qualities that we can perceive of them by postulating different experiments and 
mathematical demonstrations. Conversely, in Mutis’ translated version, three scholia follow 
immediately after the rules; these scholia aimed to explain Newton’s rules in detail. In Mutis’ 
interpretation of them, it is possible to see a clear anti-Cartesian tone, expressed in the emphasis on 
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the necessity of explaining natural phenomena by true and sufficient causes. This is intertwined with 
a limited interpretation of the logical and ontological consequences of Newton’s rules as they were 
implied, for instance, in the fact that Mutis did not refer to the ideoque connecting Rule I and Rule II 
in Newton’s version of the rules published in the second and third edition of the Principia.28 
 Newton’s doctrine, on the other hand, is just partially accepted, apparently as an exercise in 
the same anti-systemic spirit that Mutis praised: 
Newton has been the only one who has described the nature, figure, workings, causes, 
movements and all the effects of all terrestrial and celestial objects and has brought the 
light with his experiments and meditations to the most recent philosophers, geometers 
and astronomers, especially to the English (…) In consequence, how cannot I be a 
Newtonian, dear listener, seeing the importance of the truths, the efficacy of 
demonstration, the weight of the experience and in short, the freedom to philosophize 
honoring the human mind? However, I am not a Newtonian similar to those that 
consider forbidden to recognize other Philosophers who have promoted aspects of 
Natural Philosophy with his observations, experiments, vigils and works. And even 
though I prefer to move away from the great Newton in some recent discoveries, I am 
no less Newtonian for this sake (…) Indeed, those Philosophers that, merely based on 
the effects and putting aside all hypotheses, try to deduce the arguments following the 
virtuous Newtonian method; these truly follow Newton’s steps and are Newtonians in 
a sound way, contrary to those that only rest upon the master’s authority.29 
Mutis’ Newtonianism is loyal to Newton’s “way of philosophizing” and, as we shall see, to the 
metaphysical and epistemological claims implied in it. In fact, Mutis is less attached to Newton’s 
doctrines, even though he exhibits a great enthusiasm and reasonable knowledge of them. In other 
words, Mutis was less interested in following the technical problems laid out by Newton’s mechanics, 
mathematics or astronomy than other continental Newtonians such as Euler or Maupertuis; contrary 
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to the German reception of Newton, just to mention one example, Mutis valued in Newton’s legacy 
not only technical developments on mathematics and astronomy but above all, a new metaphysical 
conception of nature and the resultant approach to knowledge.30 However, it does not mean that Mutis 
had a superficial engagement with the technical problems of Newton’s experimental physics. The 
manuscript evidence suggests that he was particularly interested in the analysis of the motion of 
bodies in conic sections via Newton’s calculus of fluxions. Amongst the set of Mutis’ manuscripts 
containing his lectures in New Granada, four deal with different matters of physics, mechanics, and 
natural philosophy: his translations of ’sGravesande’s Physices elementa mathematica and of 
Newton’s Principia; the manuscript entitled Elements of mechanics [Elementos de mecánica]; and 
the manuscript entitled Knowledge required for understanding phenomena [Conocimientos para la 
inteligencia de los fenómenos]. These manuscripts, probably written between 1764 and 1777, 
encompass several matters of Newton’s physics and mechanics. In addition, they reveal multiple 
traditions converging in Mutis’ lectures on physics. These traditions are reflected in the topics he 
studied: the considerations of the body based on Newton’s matter theory as it was developed in the 
Netherlands –and especially at Leiden– during the early-eighteenth century, a conception of natural 
philosophy and physics openly based on Mutis’ interpretation of Newton’s Principia, and a nuanced 
Wolffian mechanics. In general, these manuscripts reveal that Mutis was deeply interested in teaching 
on natural laws and Newton’s characterization of attractive forces as they were applied to study the 
corpuscular constitution of bodies and to the motion of bodies in conic sections. Likewise, these 
manuscripts present forces framed in the theological foundation of the laws of nature and the 
application of mathematics to the natural philosophy that, as we mentioned in the previous section, 
underlies Mutis’ argumentative structure. In particular, in Knowledge required…, Mutis explains the 
motion of a body in an ellipse as the result of the application of both a projective force (fuerza de 
proyección) –inertial– and a centripetal force. In this manuscript, Mutis (1) argues that the centripetal 
force accelerating a body traversing an ellipse should be drawn towards one focus of the ellipse; (2) 
he considers the fact that, in elliptical motions, centripetal and inertial forces should be in equilibrium; 
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and (3) he applies the mathematical analysis directly to the planetary motion. In so doing, he treated 
the subject with geometrical demonstrations, applying it to planetary motion. Similarly, the 
manuscript resembles different passages of Newton’s Principia –especially Section VI of Book I and 
Propositions I through VIII of Book III–, in which Newton discusses the motions of bodies in conic 
sections, the forces required for their production, and the application of mathematical models to the 
phenomena of motion of heavenly bodies.31 
Certainly, that characterization reveals that the interpretation of Mutis as an advocate of 
Newton’s methodology, and his lectures in New Granada as a defense of it, only describe a partial 
aspect of Mutis’ lectures and that further research on the unpublished manuscripts shall provide more 
evidence to characterize in detail the scope of them. Nevertheless, it is possible to conclude at this 
point that, for Mutis, Newton was a not only a natural philosopher but also a metaphysician. This is 
why Mutis’ sight is directed to what we could see as a Newtonian foundation for natural history – 
consisting of zoology, botany and mineralogy, embodied in his project of the Botanical Expedition, 
as a true and useful knowledge of the world. 
Also, it is important to stress Mutis’ first-hand knowledge of Newton’s and Newtonians’ 
works, which can explain why he did not exclusively embraced Newton’s claims –an expected 
attitude of a natural philosopher relatively isolated of the cultural life of European lettres– but saw 
them as the starting point of a new and authentic way to research the natural phenomena, spreading 
across the world: “All kingdoms are now Newtonian,” wrote Mutis to the Viceroy in 1801.32 Mutis 
had the largest personal library in the Viceroyalty and probably one of the largest collections in private 
hands of natural history in the world. It is well-known that Alexander von Humboldt was deeply 
impressed by Mutis’ library and claimed that it was surpassed, at least in botany, only by Joseph 
Bank’s library at London.33 Bearing in mind the material difficulties for getting European-printed 
books in the eighteenth century in South America, Mutis’ library of around 8,588 volumes is a 
material testimony of his professed love to knowledge and interest of persistent communication with 
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the world. (Indeed, Santa Fé was located on top of the Andes and its access was considered to be so 
dangerous that travelers from Cartagena used to dictate their testaments before undertaking the 
journey).34 This library contained some of the most important works by Newton available to an 
eighteenth-century reader and, among the Newtonians’ works, it is not surprising that the often 
referred works by the Dutch Newtonians (Boerhaave, Muschenbroek and ’sGravesande) are 
represented even in different editions and translations. 
Mutis owned a 1687 edition of the Principia, the commented edition by Le Seur and Jacquier 
published between 1739-1742 in three volumes, and the French translation of Du Châtelet prefaced 
by Voltaire (1759). Mutis made a partial translation of the Principia into Spanish around 1770 –the 
first translation into that language ever made–, based on both the first edition and the Geneva 
edition.35 Mutis also owned two translations of the Opticks: the 1740 Latin translation, following the 
original made by Samuel Clarke, and the 1720 French translation by Pierre Coste. Also, Mutis had a 
copy of Newton’s optical lectures in Latin (Isaaci Newton in Academia Cantabrigiensi lectiones 
opticae: annis MDCLXIX, MDCLXX et MDCLXXI in scholis publicis habitae et nunc primum ex Mss. 
in lucem edite) (1729); a copy of The doctrine of fluxions founded on sir Isaac Newton’s method: 
published by himself in his tract upon the quadrature of curves (1758); and the three-volume set of 
the Opuscula mathematica, philosophica et philologica (1744). This is an unusual approach to 
Newton, if we bear in mind that the majority of eighteenth-century readers ignored Newton’s works 
outside mathematics and natural philosophy, as Schliesser has recently stressed.36 
For the sake of brevity, it is impossible to detail all the Newtonian works existing in Mutis’ 
library (not to mention those in the libraries of the Colegio Mayor de San Bartolomé and the Colegio 
Mayor del Rosario, to which he certainly had access); however, we will mention the most relevant to 
our point in Mutis’ library: the revision of Rohault’s Physica by Samuel Clarke (1718); a French 
translation of Colin MacLaurin’s Account of Newton (1749); John Keill’s Introduction to physics and 
astronomy in Latin (1725); a French edition of the works of Maupertuis (1768), his Discourse sur le 
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parallaxe de la lune (1741) and his La figure de la Terre (1738); also, Boerhaave’s Institutiones 
Medicae (1796), a Spanish translation of the Aphorisms (1786), his Medical Opera omnia (1766), a 
French translation of the Traité de la matière medicale (1739), among others; of his favorite Dutch, 
Musschenbroek, Mutis had a 1761 Latin edition of his Elementa Physica, a 1756 Latin edition of his 
Physica experimentales, et geometricae de magnete, and the 1739 French edition of his Essai de 
Physique. To complete the Dutch authors, Mutis owned ’sGravesande’s Physices Elementa 
Mathematica (1742) and a French translation (1746), his Introductio ad philosophiam, metaphysicam 
et logicam (1737) and the English version Mathematical elements of natural philosophy (1731). It is 
also possible to find works by Jean-Antoine Nollet, D’Alambert, Desaguliers, Boscovich, Paulian, 
Jorge Juan, just to mention a few more. Mutis’ library was well stocked with Newtonian works.  
(c) Contrary to some continental Newtonianisms, in which the technical development of 
problems pushed natural philosophers and mathematicians to accept, reject or reinterpret Newton’s 
claims –for example, the vis viva controversy or the technical limitations of Newtonian tools to solve 
the three-body problem,37 Mutis’ appropriation of Newton’s experimental physics appears in his 
lectures directed to wide social audiences; it is not derived from efforts to struggle with Newton’s 
own claims in technical issues. Being a physician interested in drawing up a Botanical Expedition, 
Mutis’ interest in technical problems of astronomy or natural philosophy were mainly related to his 
teaching during the 1760s-1770s. However, all the public statements from his arrival in New Granada 
until his death, his textbooks and notes intended for education defended the “Newtonian or 
experimental” philosophy, its foundations, its historical development and the benefits that the 
Kingdom will derive from its implementation as a collective and royal-supported effort. 
In order to detail these elements of Mutis’ Newtonianism, we will provide an analysis of his 
conception of Newtonian philosophy as a useful knowledge. However, it is necessary, to introduce 
Mutis’ specific claim that knowledge is useful by Divine commandment; in this, Newtonian 
philosophy appears on the stage. 
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The commandment of God as a royal duty: science as useful knowledge 
Mutis traveled to New Granada as a physician and a surgeon of the newly elected Viceroy Pedro 
Messía de la Cerda. However, in his Diary of Observations [Diario de Observaciones], Mutis reveals 
the real reasons motivating his journey to New Granada as he bitterly complained about the 
impossibility of fulfilling the purpose of drawing up a botanical expedition to the “southern regions” 
of America: “In Spain, I thought that by this time I would be heading to Loja, with the purpose of 
researching the quina.”38 Since his arrival in Santa Fé, center of New Granada, Mutis was constantly 
looking for appropriate conditions to explore the flora. In May 1763, supported by Viceroy Messía 
de la Cerda, he wrote from Cartagena de Indias to King Carlos III asking for authorization and funding 
to establish a Royal Botanical Expedition. The first request was ignored. One year later, in June 1764, 
Mutis tried once more to get the Royal consent sending the same request with minor additions to the 
King, but he again received no answer. As is well known, the Expedition was not fully launched until 
1783, when the Archbishop and Viceroy Antonio Caballero y Góngora first authorized it on his 
authority, and only later wrote to the King requesting his support. By then, Mutis had started with his 
own researches in natural history, and he was widely known in Santa Fé for exploiting natural 
resources, particularly minerals.39 The documents requesting Royal support present in subtle but 
straight manner Mutis thoughts about the aims of science, the connection with national interests and 
–the most revealing point– the King’s divine duty to share with the whole of humanity the benefits 
of the natural goods entrusted to him. For Mutis, a botanical expedition established upon Newtonian 
principles would be the adequate mean to fulfil this commandment. In an attempt to persuade the 
King of granting his approval and funding for the expedition, Mutis put forward two arguments. These 
arguments also appear in other writings and it would be a mistake to treat them as rhetorical strategies 
limited to convince the King of his support for the Botanical Expedition. On the contrary, they are 
intertwined with Mutis’ own conception of the problem of the utility of knowledge, widely discussed 
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in Spain, and with the divine rights of the King to which he turned a lot of times in public and private 
writings; for example, they appear in his correspondence to European friends to explain details of the 
ordinary life in the colony, to justify the compulsory character of the inoculation, or to relate his own 
version of the 1781 “revolt of the comuneros.”40 
 Mutis begins his requests of 1763/64 with a brief account of the relationship between the 
development of scientific knowledge and the improvement of the welfare of nations. In his opinion, 
Spain was behind in the development of sciences until the middle of the century, when Fernando VI 
and the regent King began to support the creation of National Academies and encouraged for example, 
the first Expedition of Limits, led by Carl Löfling –one of Linnaeus’ followers. Although this 
Expedition had the only goal of drawing the boundaries between Spanish and Portuguese domains in 
the Orinoco after the Tratado de Madrid (1750), it was also used for botanical and zoological 
explorations; Linnaeus himself had instructed his student on these matters. However, Mutis chose to 
emphasize the resemblance of his project with Francisco Hernández’s expedition to New Spain –an 
early exploration launched at the end of the seventeenth century. In so doing, Mutis was recognizing 
that the king had previously supported a project partially concerned with botany –the Expedition of 
Limits; and at the same time, he was trying to connect his own project with an earlier expedition with 
explicitly botanical and medical concerns launched during the most powerful days of the Spanish 
Empire. 
The Natural history of America, for which Europa yearns, is a work of a Monarch such 
as your Majesty. This [history] has its beginnings in the liberality of the principles of 
Philip II who, looking forward to admiring the valuable natural goods of New Spain 
and no less concerned with promoting the Good for humanity resulting therefrom 
thanks to the abundant discoveries of some medicinal and mineral goods, sent the wise 
Dr. Hernández, his Physician, with adequate resources for the Real Project.41 
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From the previous quotation it is also evident that Mutis was not only trying to align his project with 
Hernández’s; he was also trying to align Carlos III’s new reign with Felipe II’s –a reign then 
remembered as the time when the Spanish Empire reached its highest level of power and influence 
all over the world. Mutis suggested that an integral part of a successful and adequate ruling includes 
the promotion of science and in particular of botanical expeditions to find “medicinal and mineral 
goods.” However, Mutis goes on, these early attempts to consolidate expeditions to Spanish 
dominions in America were frustrated by the “Spanish lethargy” which put its scientific development 
behind in comparison with other nations.42 In spite of this, Mutis considered that Spain was then 
experiencing a rebirth after the war with Portugal and Great Britain, not only because the sovereign 
had time to improve his Kingdom, but also because he was an experienced King, having reigned for 
many years in Sicily: 
Now that your Majesty has seen the fruit of your fatigue in the solid peace that has been 
recently established, the sages shall consider your Majesty diligently dedicated to the 
complete reestablishment of Sciences, Arts and Trade; in this your Majesty will achieve 
the same happiness and skill that he has achieved in making happy, wise and 
respectable his other Kingdom.43 
For Mutis, the King’s dedication to promote natural knowledge was an obvious consequence of the 
duties all the rulers of civilized nations should observe. If Spain had no significant reputation for 
promoting natural knowledge it was because of the wars, but it was the obvious intention of a 
generous ruler to make of his Kingdom a “wise and respectable” one. Despite that all rulers of the 
“civilized nations” realized the importance of this endeavor, Mutis stressed that in the Spanish case 
the situation was more important and pressing, because of the extension of the realm and the richness, 
variety, and utility of the “treasures” therein. 
Nobody knows better than your Majesty about the immortal glory for yourself which 
shall come of this glorious endeavor skillfully performed, because no other nation than 
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Spain is concerned with the knowledge and recognition of the admirable productions 
with which the Divine Providence has enriched the extensive domains of those who are 
fortunate to live under the rule of your Majesty in this New World.44 
This promotion of science shall place Spain among the civilized nations and, in consequence, shall 
improve the glory of the sovereign. This passage also highlights a connection between the New World 
and the right to exploit its natural resources. Though Mutis was persistent in the first argument, it 
relies heavily upon the King’s personal attitudes and ultimately depends on his will. If he wanted to 
be considered a wise and generous King, he was called upon to promote arts and sciences, including 
the exploration of the rich flora of New Granada. Arts and sciences, after all, are related to trade and 
commerce. However, for Mutis himself, the promotion of arts and sciences and the connected 
exploitation of the natural resources, was more than a choice of the sovereign: it was a duty imposed 
by God’s design of the world and, in this sense, it was unavoidable. It is God’s design to have 
entrusted America to the King of Spain as the last quotation suggests. In fact, Mutis usually refers to 
natural resources as “God’s treasures contained in the dominions of His Majesty.” According to this 
view, the project of the flora of Bogotá was part of a divine plan in which the King had to distribute 
God’s gifts to humankind. 
 Mutis’ mention of this duty appears abundantly in his expositions of the healing benefits 
derived from the application of herbs and particularly in his defenses of the inoculation. In the 
representations of 1763/1764 this topic appears when mentioning the Quina (cinchona officinalis), a 
bark very well known at the court of Madrid thanks to the trade and use of it during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries from the Viceroyalty of Peru. Sebastian Bado, a Spanish seventeenth-century 
physician who first published a work about the medical properties of Quina c.1650, claimed that it 
was more precious than all the gold and silver that the Spaniards had obtained from the New World.45 
Despite the bark of Quina’s tree had proved to be exceptionally effective as a febrifuge,46 Quina had 
been discredited in Spain at Mutis’ times, because bark of bad quality or other barks confused with 
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Quina had circulated in Europe. However, it was still somewhat valued in Europe, and Mutis pinned 
his hopes on the discovery of new sources of it since his arrival in New Granada. Because of the 
proximity to Peru and the oral reports of locals that they had caught sight of similar trees near to the 
hillsides of Bogotá, Mutis felt confident that he was going to discover the bark. This happened in 
1772, according to Mutis himself.47  Bearing this in mind, he wrote to the King in his 1763/64 
requests: 
[The Quina] A medicine so admirable that competes for being greater than the others, 
among the few known antidotes, entrusted by the Divine Providence to the hands of 
your Majesty for the universal Good of mankind (…) will be scarce at the third century 
of its happy discovery if your Majesty does not rule about it in due course.48 
For Mutis, natural resources had a theological meaning. Following this thread, Quina was then 
considered one of the highest manifestations of God’s power and generosity, because of its admirable 
properties. In a similar way in which for Newton celestial movements explicitly exhibited the wisdom 
and power of God, plants and trees –and Quina in particular– had a theological meaning for Mutis: 
The Divine Providence had conceded us generously four very different varieties of 
medicinal Quina and every one of them has different virtues in its own way. His 
generosity dispensed them to us with positive signs of their abundance in relation to 
their virtues against the diseases to which every one must be applied, balancing the 
production and distribution of the medicine with the need of it, in order to reveal in this 
inestimable benefit that seal of number, weight, and measure which uncovers an 
omnipotent hand in all his works.49 
Not only were the properties of Quina a natural resource that humans should use for their own benefit. 
Natural resources have a purpose in the Divine plan in which humans are meant to reveal God’s 
generosity from the “positive signs” he had left spread over nature. These “positive signs,” as we 
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shall see, can be only discerned by experiments. The reference to God’s intervention in terms of “that 
seal of number, weight, and measure” is recurrent in Mutis’ writings as an equivalent to the Galilean 
motto that nature is written in mathematical characters.50 Accordingly, botanical explorations are not 
only desirable but also necessary in order to reach the equilibrium between disease and medicine, 
revealing God’s plan. In other words, the botanical researches are not only wanted in order to heal 
but, on the contrary, because healing by using medicinal plants is part of God’s plan. In consequence, 
humans should not only use plants, and by extension nature, for their own benefits: they must. 
Science, then, cannot be but useful and usable knowledge by divine decree. This sense of duty and 
the usefulness of science displayed in Mutis’ arguments are not present in Newton’s writings. 
If natural resources are part of a divine plan, then humans are expected to have responsibility 
in finding the proper way to establish the balance between disease and health using medicines or, in 
general terms, to use rightly the goods through which God exerts his power to fulfil his 
commandment. Humans have a central role in the divine plan; they have to explore nature to find 
medicines and the causes, connections, and properties of natural phenomena. In the case of medicine, 
the perfect match between a disease and a medicine is to be uncovered through botanical and chemical 
researches by he who manages God’s resources: the King and his subjects. The subtle but clear 
demand that Mutis put forward to the King in his representation of 1763/64 and to which he referred 
to in other writings has a theological root. 
In addition, the fact that God entrusted this resource only to the King of Spain by spreading 
the Quina exclusively in America, reinforces his unavoidable and direct responsibility. Mutis offers 
himself to help the King with such a heavy burden: “The useful Quina, a treasure only conceded to 
the domains of your Majesty, in whose hand is entrusted to distribute it to the other nations in the 
same way that the Dutch distributed Ceylon’s cinnamon (…) will be confidently, easily and rightly 
handled when my observations reach the public.”51  In the following section, it will be clearer how 
Mutis came to consider himself as playing a central role in this endeavor. 
26 
 
The Quina is just the most obvious example of the required intervention of the King as 
administrator of divine resources. However, further unknown resources that God may have deposited 
in the lands of the New World were waiting to be discovered and used for the benefit and welfare of 
humanity but also to accomplish the divine plan:  
America, in whose fortunate land the Creator deposited infinite goods worthy of 
admiration, has reached its name not only for its gold, silver, precious stones and other 
treasures hidden in its womb; also produces on its surface, for trade and utility, 
exquisite dyes which industry will find in the plants; the cochinilla, abundant in this 
Kingdom, though not farmed because of the indifference of the natives of this land; the 
precious wax of a bush named laurelito and that coming from the Palm tree; many 
glues, that can be used in the Arts; very valued woods for instruments and furniture; 
finally produces, for the Good of mankind, many other trees, herbs, resin and balsams. 
We have a long way until we know all of this; and what is most valued, we have a long 
way until we know how to use what we already have discovered.52 
If the King was responsible for supporting the exploration and distribution of natural resources, 
because God entrusted them to him science is but usable knowledge to fulfil this plan; in Mutis 
version, useful science is his Newtonian philosophy –and he, himself– a proper instrument to achieve 
this end. 
 
Mathematics and observation: the virtues of the Newtonian philosopher 
Mutis’ conception of “Newtonian” or “experimental physics” rests on a particular reading of 
methodological and epistemological topics displayed in the Principia and the Opticks. This reading 
is largely shaped by the theological views previously explained, resulting in a conception of science 
as useful knowledge both in theological and material senses. Accordingly, knowledge is understood 
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as a way to transform materially the creation. The resultant emphasis on usefulness and material 
intervention is not present at all in Newton’s works. However, Mutis’ attentive reading of Newton 
allows him to grasp central features of Newton’s empiricism, mathematics, and their relationship 
blended in his idea of useful science. 
 Mutis’ systematic explanation of his conception of science, mathematics, and experimentation 
is first exposed on the inauguration of the chair of mathematics at the Colegio del Rosario in 1762. 
Expanded versions of the main topics here presented appear in his Elements and in the prefatory 
comments to his translation of Wolff’s Elementa matheseos.53 The antecedents to the foundation of 
the first chair of mathematics in New Granada are well known and have been widely discussed. Mutis 
offered his own version of this fact. According to him, it goes back to the time when he was traveling 
to America: 
I had promised in the ship that I would give a course of mathematics at home to the 
young people travelling with H.E [His Excellency, the Viceroy Messía de la Cerda]. 
Yet a lot of time has passed since our arrival in Santa Fe, the officers and pages of the 
Viceroy make me keep my word; I prepared myself to do it, wishing to begin this course 
after the Epiphany day. Everything was set while I made up a preliminary speech. But 
after the Rector of the University was informed about my new determination, since he 
never could persuade me to lecture on Medicine for reasons that I have set down 
elsewhere, he could demand from me the consent to lecture in public on Mathematics, 
if the Viceroy stipulated it so. The 29 February he went to talk to HE about this point 
and he got what he wished. The same day, H. E. gave me in La Mesa his consent and 
pleasure in this new ruling.54 
For the inauguration, Mutis wrote and read the “Preliminary speech pronounced in the opening of the 
Course of Mathematics, 13 March 1762, in the Colegio Mayor of Our Lady of the Rosary in Santafé 
de Bogotá,”55 as he wrote in his diary. The highest religious and political authorities of the Viceroyalty 
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were in the audience, as well as members of the local elite of creoles and students, according to his 
own account.56 The “Speech” is an abridgement of philosophical and methodological issues that 
Mutis developed elsewhere. However, it is a crucial piece because it is a general exposition and 
defense of the philosophical and methodological issues rooted in Newton’s work, intended for a non-
specialist public and directed against the Peripatetic teachings widely spread in Santa Fé’s educational 
atmosphere. The “Speech” relates sciences –and foremost, mathematics– with the education of young 
people and with the development of the colony.  
 In Mutis’ use, both in the “Speech” and in the Elements, mathematics refer to: (1) the proper 
language to understand nature, because it was used by God when creating the world, establishing the 
order and harmony grasped by the human mind in the regularity of the laws of nature; this meaning 
has ontological and theological consequences; (2) a way to conduct reasoning (more geometrico) that 
can be applied outside the domain of quantitative studies, improving the process of enquiry in any 
area and preventing the mind from making mistakes; (3) the specific study of quantity, discrete and 
continuous, by means of comparing “all that can be augmented or reduced.” The way to proceed in 
the specific domain of quantity can be extended to “other matters,” giving rise then to “mixed 
Mathematics” or “Physico-Mathematical sciences.”57 Though the third and the second senses may 
appear quite similar, they actually refer to different nuances of the term. In the second sense, 
mathematics is conceived in terms of analytic and synthetic ways to proceed from experience and 
observations to general laws of nature that can be extended, for example, to medicine or botany; in 
the third, the specific methods and procedures of mathematics are applied not only to discrete and 
continual magnitudes, such as numbers and figures, but also to letters and signs, as it is done in 
specious arithmetic (algebra) or in calculus. In other words in the more geometrico sense, 
mathematics provides an order for reasoning, while in the third one it is a way to compute (“measure”) 
things by their signs, giving rise to mixed mathematics. In this third sense, Mutis advanced his ideas 
regarding mathematics in the preface for his translation of Wolff’s Elementa matheseos. Mutis’ 
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translation is made out of different excerpts of Wolff’s textbook, which are nowadays found in two 
separated manuscripts; both of them entitled Elements of arithmetic [Elementos de arismetica [sic.]] 
which complement each other. In general, both of them contain Wolff’s arithmetical definitions and 
the basic concepts and tenets of arithmetic, only varying in the extension and detail with which Mutis 
explained different topics.58 Thus, for instance, in the shortest manuscript Mutis exclusively translated 
Chapter I of Wolff’s Elementa, treating in detail the definitions of arithmetic, and including Wolff’s 
scholia and problems. Conversely, although more concise regarding the definitions –it only presents 
them without including scholia and problems– the largest manuscript includes chapters I up to VIII 
of Wolff’s Elementa, being particularly focused on the operations with fractions. The shortest 
manuscript is also important because Mutis included a preface in it, describing the historical 
approaches of mathematicians to the relation between physics and mathematics as it was related to 
the definition of quantity. In it, he argues that mathematics deals with quantities and that they can be 
considered either as intelligible or sensible. In describing sensible quantities, Mutis claims: 
[Sensible quantities] include not only what has number, sensible extension and weight 
but also what has time, motion, the light, the sounds, the qualities, the perfections, the 
relationships, chance, in general, anything having parts, modifications, comparisons, 
greater, less and greater in itself, and by comparison with other quantities of the same 
species (…) Because of this, the mathematician deals with numbers, considers bodies, 
forms figures, measures the earth, determines the depth of the sky, gets right the motion 
of celestial bodies, decomposes light, follows the sound, builds machines, adds up or 
limits their energy, raises buildings, commands armies, fortifies cities, move ships all 
around the world.59 
In this sense, Mutis concludes that although ancient mathematicians divided mathematics into 
arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy, modern mathematicians have reconsidered such 
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classification, thus establishing a simpler division between pure and mixed mathematics; being the 
latter the field of application of mathematics to the study of nature. In Mutis’ words, 
Pure mathematics considers quantity in itself, not including the consideration of any 
accident or sensible affection. These are arithmetic and geometry, both universal (…) 
Mixed-mathematics, or non-pure, considers dressed quantity and in company with 
some accident or affection [illeg.]; and because sensible affections belong to natural 
philosophy or physics, they are called physico-mathematical parts. 60 
Mutis related mathematics and physics by claiming that the latter provides its subject of study to the 
mixed mathematics as it studies natural bodies and natural phenomena known by observations and 
experiments. Arguably, this idea is founded on his conception that nature has been created in a 
mathematical manner, which, as we suggested in the previous section, is inherited from diverse 
traditions of the seventeenth century which Mutis regardless identified as Newton’s experimental 
physics. This point is particularly important because it reveals that, in the lectures following his 
Speech and Elements, Mutis presented mathematics as a theoretical and practical field, narrowly 
related to physics.  
Nevertheless, Mutis argued that in order to study nature from a mathematical point of view, 
the natural philosopher needed to know the theoretical principles underlying pure mathematics: 
“Before going deeper into the doctrine of the physico-mathematics it is required to be perfectly 
instructed in pure mathematics.”61 Such a characterization of the process required to study mixed 
mathematics reveals that Mutis conceived his lectures on mathematics with an instrumental purpose 
as a foundation to teach the theoretical elements to his students, for them to be capable of studying 
nature under the precepts of Newton. This is particularly important as it reveals that Mutis’ ultimate 
purpose with his lectures was connected with the enterprise that motivated him to travel to New 
Granada in the first place, the botanical expedition, and with its theological foundation.  
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 On the other hand, mathematics, in the first sense, is the cornerstone of sciences. The logical 
outcome of this foundational sense is that from cultivating it in the third sense, it can provide a way 
to account for natural phenomena. On the other hand, by extending its methods to other domains – as 
described in the second and third senses – more utilities are revealed: the improvement of the ability 
to reason rightly, the preservation of life, the improvement of navigation and exploration of unknown 
seas and lands, for example. For Mutis, the foundation of mathematics and the cause of its capability 
to account for natural phenomena are ultimately based on theological considerations: 
When God created the world –this so wonderful machine that we shall never live 
enough to admire sufficiently– seems to have formed the high design to implement 
mathematical laws. Everything was created by number, weight and measure with an 
order so constant that they shall remain until some day (…) Not in vain a wise man said 
that the World is a large book and, though open to all, just a few can read it, because it 
is written with ciphers and mathematical characters.62 
In the language of the mechanical philosophy current in seventeenth-century Europe and well known 
to Mutis, the world was conceived as a machine, whose processes can be explained in terms of 
mathematical laws, because God seems to have turned to numbers during the creation; in other words, 
the world is an exercise of God’s knowledge of mathematics. In consequence, it constitutes the proper 
way to understand “this so wonderful machine.” Interestingly, Mutis encompassed this theologically-
based conception of the relationship between mathematics and physics with some religious 
considerations that can be identified with the theological purposes underpinning the Botanical 
Expedition. These considerations are reflected in the fact that the knowledge of God’s actions allowed 
humans to determine the best manner to adore him; a relationship that resembles Mutis’ presentation 
of the method of analysis and synthesis as we described it. 
Here, it is important to stress that for Mutis the mathematical structure of the creation includes 
natural history and medicine, as they were related to both chemical and physiological phenomena that 
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can be explained in mathematical terms. In addition, Mutis also stressed his Newtonianism in these 
disciplines by extending to them the implications of Newton’s treatment of attractive forces –which 
he knew through ‘sGravesande’s interpretation. In so doing, Mutis connected his Newtonianism with 
the tradition of the Newtonian medicine developed in the early eighteenth century in the works of 
physicians such as Albercht von Haller, Archibald Pitcairne, James Keill, and Boerhaave; Actually, 
as a training surgeon in Cadiz, Mutis reproduced von Haller’s experiments and vivisections and in 
New Granada he relied on Boerhaave’s Aphorisms and Institutiones Medicae as textbooks for the 
curriculum of medicine that he prepared in 1804 for the Colegio del Rosario.63 The conditional 
character of this knowledge –that God seems to have turned to mathematics in the creation– will be 
clarified with the exposition of the virtues of the philosopher. This conception of mathematics 
explains, as we have seen, why Mutis believed that mathematics could account for natural 
phenomena; and, on the other hand, it reveals that mathematics is an antidote against atheism: 
But if the world is designed following such wise and manifest laws, how important is 
it for the man looking for knowledge to set aside a short time to the contemplation of 
things entering through senses, as the most adequate means to properly praise the 
Creator? Atheism had not progressed and the spirit of so many barbarous nations had 
not degraded to such terms that would have embarrassed the lofty status of human 
nature in all ages.64 
Indeed, Mutis considered that the main business of natural philosophy, and of knowledge in general, 
is to serve as solid foundation for natural religion and moral philosophy, leading humans in a “very 
agreeable way to the high knowledge of the Author of Nature and Creator of the Universe”; because 
studying nature amounts to leading to the knowledge of the wonderful works of that Sovereign 
Creator, who allows himself to be known, in part, from the visible things.65 
 As ambiguous as the expression “Newtonian methodology” can be –Newton’s methodological 
guidelines and procedures in the Principia and the Opticks are not a coherent and unified set of rules 
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or strategies; we can note differences between what Newton calls “deduction from phenomena” in 
the Principia and the demonstrative parts of the Opticks, on the one hand; and the exploration and 
speculation about hypothetical statements in the Queries, on the other. According to the “Speech” 
and the Elements, Mutis firmly identified “the method of Newton” with the former, supporting 
Newton’s famous statement “hypotheses non fingo.” For Mutis, Newton “never decided to suppose 
not even one of his favorite principles: he never made a supposition, because he was not concerned 
with the establishment of a system.”66 The result is that Mutis aligned Newton’s methodology and 
his own with the analytical and synthetic style which he also reads in the Opticks –except for the 
analogical reasoning we have explained before, justified by the nature of the subject, but Newtonian 
for his deduction from the rules for philosophizing. 
In the introduction to Elements, Mutis claims that “the Book of nature is only studied now by 
means of observation and experience establishing reasoning in the safer way of mathematical 
demonstration.” Observation and experience or “the contemplation of things entering through senses” 
is the starting point of any enquiry. In Mutis’ view, mathematics constitutes a way to infer causes 
from the given phenomena and to demonstrate these conclusions, but it cannot postulate the existence 
of the entities; these must be uncovered by experience. On the contrary, mathematics is the way by 
means of which, starting from observation and experiments, we can “rise to the discovery of the 
causes by their effects, and to explain the effects by their causes. For this he [Newton] used a sublime 
Geometry which was always his guide in his delicate and prickly enquiries.” Mutis introduced 
Newton’s method of analysis and synthesis in Elements in order to explain how it allows the study of 
nature without the problems of the speculative-deductive systems, by establishing a relationship 
between mathematics and natural philosophy. He established such a relationship in both 
methodological and conceptual levels, arguing that the principles of the geometrical method of 
analysis and synthesis should guide the study of nature to discover the laws ruling the motion of 
bodies.  
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 In Mutis’ view, the most important of Newton’s teachings was that “it was necessary to 
consult nature itself, to follow all its steps in all its manifest operations and to extract from it womb 
the mysteries it hides from us.” The uncovering of the causes of phenomena must start from their 
attentive observation by applying the analytical method, not from principles supposed or deduced 
from other principles. However, experimental findings are not only the departure point for launching 
researches but also, following Newton’s Rule IV, a permanent referent for the philosopher during the 
enquiry. For Mutis, this is crystal-clear in Newton’s work: “He never wanted to hear any objection 
against an evident experience, even though it were deduced from the subtlest reflection of 
metaphysics.” Accordingly, experience is the link between the findings of knowledge and the actual 
structure of phenomena to be explained. In this sense, experience is the touchstone of the mind. 
This is so because our knowledge of the world ultimately rests on the way God decided to 
arrange nature; in this sense, our knowledge is always limited.67 For Mutis, empiricism is based on a 
particular conception of God’s relation with his works. In translating ’sGravesande’s interpretation 
of Newton’s arguments in the “Scholium Generale” to the Principia, Mutis considers that experience 
and observation is the only way to the true study of nature. In his view, a God acting through constant 
laws in nature supports the relation between knowledge and experience. In order to justify this, Mutis 
included in his translation a set of definitions found in Book I of the Physices Elementa Mathematica 
in which ’sGravesande describes Newton’s methodology in the Principia: natural things are bodies 
(Def. 1) and the sum of all bodies is the universe (Def. 2). Natural phenomena are “the movements 
and all situation of natural bodies not depending immediately upon the action of an intelligent 
being,”68 that is, their movement is not caused by the immediate action of God (3). Voluntary 
movements are part of natural phenomena, but it is necessary to distinguish between those movements 
depending on our own will and those depending on other causes (4). All these movements follow 
specific and determinate laws (5). Even those phenomena that we consider arising from chance, such 
as the growth of plants, could be explained in terms of laws if we had at hand sufficient observations 
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to discover regularities and uncover causal bonds. When we discover that the entire world is subject 
to laws, we find the foundation of all reasoning of physics (Def. 7) in this supreme principle: “Axiom. 
The Creator of the universe rules all things with specific and constant laws, appropriate to his wisdom, 
arising spontaneously from the very nature of things” (Def. 8). Physics then is the enquiry into, and 
explanation of, natural phenomena, that is, it uncovers and exposes the causes of phenomena (Def. 
9). In examining these causes, the body in general must be examined and, after this, it should be asked 
“what rules God wanted to be executed in these motions. These rules are called laws of nature” (Def. 
10). This is why “a law of nature is that rule or constant norm, according to which God wanted these 
movements to be performed” (Def. 11). In consequence, a law of nature is, from the human point of 
view, a simple effect that appears in all occasions as one and the same and whose cause is unknown 
to us, whenever we cannot discover that it arises from a law already known; because they can arise 
as well from any other law simpler, but concealed from us (Def. 12). However, in what concerns to 
us, we do not care that one thing depends immediately on God’s will or that it will be known to us by 
any other mediate cause that we ignore (Def. 13). The conclusion of all these 13 definitions is that “it 
is then evident that we cannot know the laws of nature but by examining natural phenomena” (Def. 
14).69 
Hitherto we have shown how Mutis appropriates and defends “the method of Newton,” 
developing some methodological conclusions and theological foundations not present in Newton’s 
works. This appropriation, as we argued, conceives Newtonian philosophy as a useful science. This 
conception also imposes a moral exigency for the philosopher sketched in Newton’s theological and 
historical studies known to Mutis. He subsumes these moral virtues of the philosopher under his own 
understanding of him as an executioner of God’s plan. In other words, because knowing the world 
amounts to being a servant of God’s plan, a material executor of divine designs –a kind of demiurge–
, the philosopher must be the bearer of moral virtues required by his role in the theological ordering 
of the world: “[To the knowledge of the Creator] are to be oriented the sight of the philosopher (…) 
36 
 
because it is certain that it is not possible to contemplate and admire the order of such an excellent 
system without at the same time being part of the general harmony of nature in order to arise to the 
Creator.”70 Mutis connects a set of virtues with the experimental or Newtonian philosopher: diligence, 
patience, humility; in so doing, he reinterprets Newton’s methodological and epistemological 
statements as implying a moral condition required to follow the adequate path that shall led to 
fulfilling the divine designs: “In order to reach such high ends, the Philosopher may not be 
precipitated in his discoveries; rather he must follow his path with due humility and the highest 
precaution in these matters.” The history of philosophy contains plenty of examples of the natural 
inclination of humans to fall into superstition; this happened when they “applied themselves to 
penetrate the hidden mysteries of nature without the due precautions.”71 In this way, experimental or 
Newtonian philosophy is restricted to those who do not expect to build by themselves a complete 
system of the world, but to those who are willing to contribute, even to a small measure, to the hard 
task of understanding natural effects by their causes. In so doing, they shed light on and complete 
divine designs, despite the limitations of the human mind.  
The knowledge we have of nature, though imperfect, is always useful to represent to 
us that Sovereign Power, which dominates all things and though never weakens. This 
is the main end of a philosopher; and in order to reach it, he must not hasten our 
discoveries creating systems to waste the time, leading to impiety and atheism, or to 
form dangerous opinions on the divinity and the universe.72 
This moral exigency should not to be confused with the moral consequences of natural philosophy to 
which Newton referred at the end of the Opticks and in other works on historical studies and natural 
religion known to Mutis.73 On one hand, the philosopher ought to be humble to reach knowledge; on 
the other, the complete system of natural philosophy would provide or at least indicate a moral 
philosophy by indicating our duties towards each other. Bearing in mind the limits of knowledge and 
the difficulties in establishing firm conclusions from experiences, the philosopher has to be patient 
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and dedicated; his sight should be directed to a divine end, not to his own glory. The immensity and 
complexity of the world cannot be grasped all at once, but by the experimental work without any 
individual interests. In opposition to this attitude, Mutis links the attitudes of those who pursue the 
fame and look to immortalize their names with the construction of complete systems and ambitious 
explanations without appealing to experience and mathematics. The result of this attitude is the 
construction of systems leading to atheism; if natural philosophy is the foundation of religion, then a 
false natural philosophy would lead to a false religion or even to atheism, a formula present in 
Newton’s works and widely spread among supporters of experimental philosophy in other latitudes, 
mainly in Britain.74 Through these religious and moral derivations of his Newtonianism, inherited 
and reinterpreted from Newton’s own works, Mutis reinforces his arguments in favor of the 
Newtonian philosophy for having pious implications supporting the true religion and, in this sense, 
responsive to the challenges of a useful science for the Spanish America. 
Mutis considered himself as fulfilling the requirements of the natural philosopher. However, 
how can a bearer of these moral virtues claim that he is such? Mutis’ strategy for so doing was to 
point to his actions. In his Representations to the King of 1763/64, when Mutis asked for support and 
funding for the Botanical Expedition, he claims: 
When considering the happy outcomes of my enterprise, I do not know if you, my Lord, 
say [that they are done] to perpetrate among the wise men an eternal gratitude to the 
immortal glory of H. M, or that for not a little confusion of myself Providence had 
reserved in your Court a young adventurous and full of life, vassal of H.M. (designated 
a few years ago to go to London under the Royal protection of the August Brother 
Predecessor of H.M. by the reports of your Excellent Minister. D. Ricardo Wall) who 
deprived of orders, help and royal protection (…), only guided and inspired by the glory 
of the Nation, would have by himself determined by his hand to continue the works of 
those Great Monarchs, Predecessors of H.M. All this has been verified in myself; and 
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it is publicly known in this Kingdom (…) that I wanted to throw myself into such an 
arduous task.75 
He, in his view, was concerned solely with “the glory and Universal Good of the Nation,” leaving 
aside his “particular interests.” Mutis himself was an adequate bearer of the moral virtues and the 
Newtonian way required to advance in God’s plan for America. 
 
Conclusion 
The traditional historiographies on the eighteenth-century New Granada have uncritically subsumed 
all the intellectual and cultural phenomena occurring in this corner of the Spanish Empire under the 
general label of “Enlightenment,” concealing historical process such as the appropriation of 
Newtonian philosophy –introduced by Mutis and inherited in different ways by his enlightened 
students. A general revision of this understanding of the Enlightenment, supported by recent studies, 
has opened an adequate space to advance in our understanding of Mutis’ engagement with Newton 
in the light of the recent debates on eighteenth-century Newtonianism and natural philosophy. 
As we expect to have shown, Mutis’ “Newtonianism” is not a mere appeal to authority, but 
an original appropriation of Newton’s doctrine and method to provide a foundation and to derive 
consequences for areas non-traditionally considered as Newtonian: natural history and medicine. In 
so doing, Mutis unfolds a critical examination of Newton’s methodological precepts and the order of 
sciences. This examination leads to the development of epistemological and metaphysical positions 
not present in Newton’s works but sharply derived from his own understanding of them, mediated by 
his reading and translations of European eighteenth-century Newtonians such as 'sGravesande and 
Musschenbroek. In this sense, we claim that Mutis was a committed and creative Newtonian. 
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This examination of Mutis’ conception of Newtonian experimental physics is also a starting 
point to more detailed studies on Mutis’ appropriation of Newton’s in the context of the eighteenth-
century Newtonianism. Indeed, Mutis takes sides on interesting topics familiar to others Newtonians 
of the period such as the cause of universal gravitation, the nature of bodies and forces, the nature 
and properties of light and the theological underpinnings of laws of nature; all these deserve separate 
studies. Mutis reconciliation of Newtonian philosophy with Catholic challenges through his useful 
science can open new questions and routes on the relationship between science, religion, and society 
in Catholic contexts. In addition, it is necessary to revisit Mutis’ works on natural history, medicine 
and hygiene to make visible the underlying Newtonian principles not recognized by the existing 
accounts –in most cases, the references to Newton are just ignored. This new perspective will 
contribute to a better understanding of his achievements and of the resources he used in solving the 
educational and medical problems he found in New Granada. However, this does not lead to a 
reduction of all his contributions to a successful application of Newton’s method. Conversely, it 
brings to light a structural element present in Mutis’ works widely ignored or minimized that needs 
to be placed in context to improve our understanding of the specifics of his achievements in every 
field, of the spreading of Newtonianism in New Granada through his disciples and, in general terms, 
as a contribution to the reexamination of the abused idea of Enlightenment. If our reading of Mutis’ 
Newtonianism is right, it can also provide elements to contribute to the on-going debates on topics 
such as the botanical expeditions and the creation of a visual culture unknown to Europeans. Indeed, 
Mutis’ Botanical Expedition is unique in being conceived and executed as an exercise in the 
experimental teachings of Newton, the “Prince of Philosophers.”76 
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